Space-or object-based models, on the one hand, and structural-informational models, on the other hand, reflect conceptually distinct approaches to visual selective attention. In 3 studies, the authors contrasted these approaches by jointly applying prototypical routines prescribed in each approach. Following a space-based paradigm developed by M. I. Poser, participants were cued to attend to a certain spatial location, and performance at expected and unexpected locations was compared. Following a structural paradigm developed by W. R. Garner, the targets were color words printed in various colors, and the participants responded to either the color or the word component of the stimulus. Performance was poorer at unexpected than at expected locations. However, comparable amounts of Stroop and Garner interference affected performance at both expected and unexpected locations. It is suggested that the processes that govern (a) input selection from the visual field and (b) dimensional selection from the stimulus reflect fundamentally different systems of attention.
Selective attention enables the processing of salient objects or regions in the visual field, and it similarly enables the processing of relevant features or dimensions of stimuli presented for view. Theories of selective attention have concerned the former or the latter aspect of the human ability to make use of privileged sources of information in the environment. Posner's (e.g., 1978 Posner's (e.g., , 1980 visual orienting model, Treisman's (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Schmidt, 1982) feature integration theory, and Duncan's (e.g., 1980 Duncan's (e.g., ,1984 object-based model of visual attention all concern the former process of segregating the visual input into well-processed and less well-processed chunks. Garner's (e.g., 1962 Garner's (e.g., , 1974 ) structural-informational model concerns, in contrast, the latter process of deconstructing the stimulus into observed and ignored dimensions. The notion of a spotlight that dichotomizes the visual field into attended ("illuminated") and unattended parts has become to epitomize much (though not all) of the former research. The notion of perceptual independence that dichotomizes the stimulus into attended and unattended dimensions characterizes much of the latter research. In Posner's approach, selective attention helps to set apart regions and objects that differ in processing priority. In Garner's approach, by contrast, attention is considered to be an intraobject process, setting apart task-relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions. In the three decades of modern attention research, these disparate concepts have led separate lives, each confined to its own theoretical camp or school. However, consideration of the relationship between these two important traditions is imperative as theorists of attention seek to reach consensus about the fundamental units or levels of analysis in their discipline.
Are the concepts associated with the research programs developed by Posner and Garner really the same, or do they reflect different processes, albeit sharing the same label? If the former is true, how much do they overlap? Are both required for understanding selective attention, or can we get away with only one? This study is devoted to a discussion, informed by pertinent research, of these consequential questions. We believe that an adequate understanding of human selective attention remains elusive, in part, because of the noted diversity of theoretical perspectives and empirical findings that exist without any serious attempt at integration. Therefore, in this article we focus on elucidating the seemingly contradictory premises and results of two influential approaches to the problem of selective attention.
Models of selective attention are continuously shaped and constrained by empirical data. Therefore, it is important to consider carefully the experimental techniques used to sustain the models that have been proposed by Posner and Garner to characterize attentional processes. In the current study, we apply both of the prototypical techniques prescribed by these investigators and test them within the framework of single experimental design. We elected to examine the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935) , because it comprises one major phenomenon probed by theorists from both camps. To anticipate our conclusions, important insights on the nature of attentional processes can be gained from the combined application of experimental procedures from two major, yet heretofore disparate, research traditions. We proposed an integrated model that brings together the two traditions-as complementary concepts rather than antagonistic rivals.
Two Conceptions of Selective Attention
Despite the central role of selective attention in current cognitive research, the research traditions associated with Posner and Garner have consistently differed in their interpretation of that role. A vital notion in Posner's research program has been that of space: The perceiver ignores stimuli in one region of the visual space (unattended stimuli) and processes stimuli in another region (attended stimuli). Selection in this tradition refers to regions in space with attention directed to objects or events occurring in those privileged locations. Garner's program, by contrast, eschews the notion of space and concentrates instead on that of the separability of stimulus components. The perceiver ignores variation in one stimulus component and processes variation in another stimulus component. Selection in this tradition refers to stimulus dimensions or components (by definition, inhering in the same object or location of the visual space), and attention is similarly directed to target dimensions or components.
Again, these two research traditions have developed independently with little opportunity for interaction or exchange. Reviewing the first tradition, Kahneman and Treisman (1984) did not make a single reference to the work by Garner or his associates. Conversely, in Garner's (1974) seminal work, the terms "space," "spatial dimension," and "location," do not appear in the index. As a brief review of each tradition will show, there are important differences between them in theoretical emphasis and in the experimental tasks used to elucidate the properties of selective attention.
Selective Attention-The Spatial Conception Given sufficient time, perceivers are able to search the visual field by moving their heads and eyes, and then focusing on the stimulus of interest. In a series of pioneering experiments, Posner and his associates (Posner, 1978 (Posner, , 1980 Posner, Nissen, & Ogden, 1977; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980) have shown that a similar process of selection and focusing-attention-was operating under conditions that precluded head and eye movements due to very short durations of exposure. Consequently, Posner (1980) distinguished between overt and covert orienting of attention, the former observed through head and eye movements, the latter through benefits and costs to performance wrought by centrally controlled attention. Recent studies based on the use of advanced electrophysiological techniques (see Posner & Raichle, 1994 , for a review) have uncovered the close physiological association between overt and covert attention. Damage to the midbrain's superior colliculus results in both slower voluntary eye movements and slower speed of covert attentional orientation. Conceptually, too, the notion of attention in Posner's approach continues to carry the spatial quality associated with eye movements. Both overt and covert orientations are assumed to operate in the visual space, ignoring some regions and focusing on others.
The metaphors used to describe the operation of visual attention, apart from the notion of spotlight (Broadbent, 1982; Downing & Pinker, 1985; Posner et al., 1980; Shulman, Remington, & McLean, 1979; Tsal, 1983; Tsal & Lavie, 1988) , include those of "zoom lens" (Eriksen & Hoffman, 1972; Eriksen & St. James, 1986) , "gating" (Reeves & Sperling, 1986) , and "gradient" without (Laberge & Brown, 1989) or with a filter (Cheal, Lyon, & Gottlob, 1994) , along with the common usage of terms such as "attentional gaze" or "attentional focus." They all attest to the fundamentally spatial nature of attention in this tradition. The very term "spotlight" is a natural derivative of the spatial milieu in which attention is assumed to operate.
The idea that visual attention is controlled by space has been challenged recently by object-based (e.g., Duncan, 1980 Duncan, , 1984 , Gestalt grouping-based (e.g., Vecera & Farah, 1994) , or movement-based accounts of selection (Driver & Baylis, 1989) . Rock and Guttman (1981) and Tipper (1985) have shown that participants can attend to one of two superimposed forms, a task entailing no spatial basis for selection. Duncan (1984) , in an influential study, has similarly shown that, for objects superimposed in the same locus, a pair of attributes from the same object is reported more accurately than a pair of attributes from different objects. Driver and Baylis (1989) have shown that distant distractors that move with a target produce more interference than static abstractors nearer the target, thereby undermining the spatial contiguity notion associated with the spotlight metaphor. Treisman's (1986; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Gormican, 1988) feature integration theory, a space-based model, has not been inhospitable to object-based means of processing as well. For instance, Kahneman and Treisman (1984) have suggested that the attributes of a selected stimulus are brought together in a temporary object file that maintains the identity and continuity of an object perceived in a particular episode.
Object-based and space-based models differ on the primary means assumed to govern attentional selection: feature-object linkages in the former, feature-space linkages in the latter. This major difference notwithstanding, both models agree on the fundamentally holistic nature of visual attention. Attention operates in chunks whether they are defined by physical proximity, objectness, or another organizational principle. Because they share this fundamental principle, we considered the models associated with the research programs of Posner, Treisman, and Duncan to belong in the same general class. They all contrast with Garner's analytical approach. We elaborate on this important distinction in the General Discussion. Because Posner's cost-benefit paradigm has produced an unusually large and coherent set of data (Briand, 1998; Briand & Klein, 1987) , we decided to apply it in our study. A brief discussion of this experimental task follows.
Posner's Cost-Benefit Experiment-A Prototypical
Paradigm in the Spatial Tradition
In a typical procedure (e.g., Posner, 1978 Posner, ,1980 , the participant is asked to detect a target stimulus-usually a simple unidimensional signal-that can appear in several locations in the visual field. Prior to the presentation of the target, a directional cue is displayed providing the participant with information on the likely spatial location of the target. On valid trials, the target is presented in the cued location (say, on 80% of all trials). On invalid trials (20% of the trials), the target appears in a location other than that indicated by the cue. The effect of attention is gauged by the difference in performance (reaction time and accuracy) between valid and invalid trials. If a neutral condition is included-entailing the presentation of warning cues that give no information on the location of the target-then the effect of attention can be decomposed into benefit (for valid cues) and cost (for invalid cues). The difference in performance between valid and neutral trials yields an estimate of the benefit, and the respective difference between invalid and neutral trials gives an estimate of the cost. Studies using this general procedure (e.g., Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980; Briand, 1998; Briand & Klein, 1987; Klein, 1979; Posner et al., 1980; Tsal & Lavie, 1988) have reported that performance is better at cued than at falsely cued locations.
Selective Attention-The Information Conception Let us consider Garner's analytical approach to selective attention. The onus of theoretical construction in this approach is placed on intrastimulus structure, not on interstimulus spatial organization. The following common observation forms the basis of the analytic approach to selective attention. The objects in our perceptual milieu are multidimensional. The books on your shelf come in certain colors, sizes, and weights; the cars on our roads differ at least along the dimensions of color, shape, size, and velocity. However, under virtually all circumstances, people respond to variations occurring on a single, relevant, dimension of the multidimensional stimuli, ignoring concurrent variation on other, irrelevant dimensions. People attend to the speed of the cars while crossing an intersection and ignore car-to-car variation in color and shape. On another occasion, people may attend to the shape of the cars ignoring variation in color and speed. The issue of consequence is this: Can one attend selectively to the speed of the cars on the road without being distracted by the differences in their shape, color, or size? And, in general, how do the different stimulus dimensions interact during perceptual processing?
Directing attention to the relevant dimension often succeeds, but also often fails. If the results of a series of experimental tasks (Garner, 1962; Maddox, 1992; Melara, 1992) show independent processing by dimensions, then those dimensions are termed separable dimensions. In this case selective attention is good, because people are able to analyze the stimulus into components, with neither component affecting performance on the other component. If, on the other hand, the experimental results indicate processing of the stimulus as an unanalyzed whole, then the dimensions are termed integral dimensions. That result, in turn, registers the failure of selective attention, because people cannot avoid noticing changes occurring on an irrelevant dimension while trying to attend to changes occurring on the relevant dimension. As a result, irrelevant variation intrudes on performance with the relevant dimension. Prototypical separable dimensions are hue and shape, and prototypical integral dimensions are hue and brightness (Garner, 1974; Garner & Felfoldy, 1970) . Below, we describe the Garnerian design, one that we also applied in the current study.
Gamer's Speeded Classification Experiment-A Prototypical Paradigm in the Information Tradition Take the Stroop task for an example: Suppose that there are two color words {red, blue) each printed in two colors (red or blue) creating four possible stimuli {red in red, red in blue, blue in red, and blue in blue). A single stimulus combination appears on a trial, and the participant's task is to classify the stimulus on the relevant dimension as the stimuli change randomly from trial to trial.
In the baseline task, the participant is asked to classify values on the relevant dimension (say, whether the word is red or blue) with values on the irrelevant dimension held constant (all the words are printed in red). In the filtering task, the participant again classifies stimuli on the relevant dimension (word), but values on the irrelevant dimension also vary in an orthogonal fashion (there are trial-to-trial changes in irrelevant print color). The ability to attend selectively is gauged by comparing performance in the baseline condition (in which the irrelevant dimension is held constant) with that in the filtering condition (in which values on the irrelevant dimension vary orthogonally). If the speed and accuracy of classification in filtering is similar to those at baseline, then selective attention is good. The parity implies that participants were able to focus their attention to the criterial dimension (e.g., word) without suffering distraction from irrelevant variation on another dimension (color). Conversely, if performance is worse in filtering than at baseline, then selective attention has failed. The difference in reaction time (RT) between filtering and baseline, termed the "Garner interference" (Pomerantz, 1986) , reflects the inability to focus exclusively on the relevant dimension. Garner interference provides an operational definition for the separability or integrality of dimensions. Dimensions producing an appreciable amount of Garner interference are integral or interactive dimensions, and dimensions that do not lead to significant Garner interference are separable dimensions.
Integral and separable dimensions can be distinguished by further empirical criteria (Garner, 1974; Melara, 1992; Pomerantz, 1986 ). An important one relates to performance in correlated dimensions tasks, in which the values on the two dimensions vary in a perfectly correlated manner. In such tasks, all the stimuli either match-reds are printed in red and blues are printed in blue-or all mismatch-reds are printed in blue and blues are printed in red-for positively and negatively correlated sets of stimuli, respectively. For integral dimensions, classification in the correlated dimensions tasks is better than that at baseline. For these continua, participants reap gain from the correlated variation of values on an irrelevant dimension (redundancy gain, but they suffer Garner interference from orthogonal variation in the filtering task). For separable dimensions, participants neither reap redundancy gain (in the correlated dimensions tasks) nor suffer Garner interference (in filtering), resulting in approximately equal performance at baseline, filtering, and in the correlated dimensions tasks.
These operational definitions for the integrality or separability of stimulus dimensions have been supplemented and refined within the framework of a novel conceptual approach, general recognition theory (GRT), developed recently by Ashby, Maddox, Townsend, and their colleagues (e.g., Ashby & Gott, 1988; Ashby & Maddox, 1994; Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Kadlec & Townsend, 1992; Maddox, 1992) . Following traditional signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966) , a distinction is proposed within GRT between perceptual separability (or integrality) and decisional separability (or integrality). Espousing GRT, separability derived on the basis of Garner's operational approach only holds as long as decisional separability is satisfied. Nevertheless, we decided to follow the classical methodology developed by Garner in this study. Our reasons were threefold. First, the main theoretical thrust and virtually all studies within GRT have concerned unspeeded identification and classification data, not RT data. To effect our pioneering comparison of Posnerian and Gar-nerian attention, however, we used and emphasized RT in the current study. Second, Maddox (1992) has shown that of the variety of procedures extant in the literature to test dimensional separability and selective attention, the Garnerian filtering task is the strongest one theoretically. Moreover, because "the ideal observer frequently utilizes decisional separability in the filtering condition" (Maddox, 1992, p. 179) , the outcome of the filtering task can safely be taken to reflect dimensional separability. In the current study, we used the Garnerian filtering task as our crucial measure of separability. Third, to broaden the appeal of our contrast of theories, we opted for the deployment of the prototypical procedures used within each theoretical school. This consideration made the standard Garnerian procedure the candidate of choice. That granted, we use the insights provided by GRT to further elucidate our results in the General Discussion.
In summary, in the present study we combined Garner and Posner's typical paradigms within a single experimental design probing the Stroop effect.
Selective Attention and the Stroop Effect
The Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935 ) is well known: Presented with color words printed in various colors, participants can attend selectively to the words but cannot attend selectively to the colors. The participants do not suffer in their reading performance by irrelevant changes in color: They read the color words in color as quickly and accurately as they read the same words printed in black. However, when the participants are naming colors, selective attention fails. They name the color of the color words poorly compared with a condition in which they are asked to name the color of irregular shapes.
The Stroop effect is one major cognitive phenomenon that has been studied by researchers from both camps. Characteristically, though, the different theoretical backgrounds have dictated different variables of interest: spatial separability in the first tradition, dimensional separability in the second. The following two studies illustrate the two approaches. Kahneman and Henik (1981) , coming from the spatial tradition, studied the effect of spatial separation of components on the Stroop effect. Assuming that attention facilitates all of the responses associated with the selected object, they predicted and found greater interference when the relevant color and the irrelevant word were conjoined in a single stimulus than when they were spatially separated. Apparently, it was easier for participants to filter out the incompatible color word when it was not part of the same perceptual object than when both attributes inhered in the same object. Kahneman and Henik concluded that "the efficacy of object selection is such that it greatly reduces the elicitation of conflicting responses by objects in unattended locations" (p. 188). Conversely, interference is severe if the entire Stroop stimulus falls within the spatial bounds of attention. As Kahneman and Treisman (1984) stated, "Attention affects the object file as a unit. As a result, Stroop interference is especially severe when the color and the word belong to the same object because it appears impossible to attend to the color without simultaneously facilitating the response to the word" (p. 55). Melara and Mounts (1993) , coming from the information tradition, studied the effect of dimensional discriminability on the Stroop effect. Discriminability refers to the psychological difference separating two stimulus values along a dimension. It is measured by the speed and accuracy needed to identify stimuli along a dimension as the stimuli alternate randomly from trial to trial. In the Stroop task, the dimensions of word and color are matched in discriminability if the speed and accuracy in classifying words into red and blue (with color print held constant) equals those in classifying colors into red and blue (with word held constant). Note that discriminability is an intradimensional index, measured separately for each of the tested dimensions.
Let us issue a caveat before proceeding. Manipulations of relative dimensional discriminability only affect selective attention to the relevant dimension, not perception of the pertinent stimuli (e.g., Garner & Felfoldy, 1970; Maddox, 1992; Pomerantz, 1983 Pomerantz, , 1986 . Changing dimensional discriminability does not alter the psychophysical performance observed with the pertinent stimuli. All of the stimuli are separated well beyond the constraints posed by imperfect resolution or by the difference threshold. A glance at the accuracy scores obtained in the cited studies including the current one suffices to clarify this (often misconceived) point: Throughout the various experiments, accuracy was close to 100%. Thus, stimulus values along the less discriminable dimension are also perfectly discriminable in a perceptual or psychophysical sense. What modifications of dimensional discriminability do accomplish is making one of the dimensions more salient than the other, and, hence, attention catching. Another consideration should also be appreciated. A given pattern of dimensional discriminability only applies to a particular response mode (e.g., keypress or oral responding). The same stimuli may yield another pattern of relative discriminability for another response mode. Thus, stimulus components equally discriminable for oral responding may turn out to be mismatched in discriminability when response mode is changed to keypressing. Nevertheless, the same rule holds once the response is specified: The more discriminable dimension interferes with attention to the less discriminable dimension but not vice versa. Melara and Mounts (1993) have manipulated the discriminability of the Stroop dimensions of word and color. When mismatched in favor of words, the usual Stroop (and Garner) interference obtained. Classification of color was impaired by irrelevant variation in words, but classification of word was largely unaffected by variations in colors. Remarkably, when the dimensions matched, selective attention was good for both color and word, and Stroop and Garner interference vanished. Finally, when colors were made more discriminable than words, the reverse Stroop effect obtained, with colors intruding on classification of words, but not vice versa.
The set of results obtained by Melara and Mounts (1993;  see also Algom, Dekel, & Pansky, 1993; Arieh & Algom, 1997; Pansky & Algom, 1999 ) is striking, challenging traditional conceptions of the Stroop phenomenon as a "gold standard" (cf. MacLeod, 1992) of attention and automaticity. These researchers were able to fabricate Stroop and reverse Stroop effects at will, as well as to eliminate the effects altogether, by judiciously manipulating the baseline discriminability of the constituent dimensions. Melara and Mounts (1993) concluded that interaction is not inevitable in the classifying of Stroop dimensions: The magnitude, the presence or absence, and even the form (regular or reverse) of the Stroop effect is easily manipulated.. . especially by the degree of match in baseline discriminability. In this sense, it appears that the Stroop effect is an optional effect, (p. 643) The Current Study
In this study, we combined Posner's cost-benefit paradigm with Gamer's speeded classification paradigm in a rigorous study of the Stroop effect. We presented color-word stimuli appearing in expected and unexpected locations in the visual field. The participant's task was to classify, while timed, the color or the word of the Stroop stimulus. Therefore, we manipulated attention by two means, spatial and informational. Following Posner, we manipulated attention by having the Stroop stimuli appear in validly cued and invalidly cued locations in the visual field. Following Garner, we used multidimensional Stroop stimuli, manipulating attention by effecting variation in the task-irrelevant dimension of those stimuli. Our study thus entailed speeded classification of dimensional values of the stimuli (espousing Garner's design) that appeared at attended and unattended locations (espousing Posner's design). Therefore, throughout this study, participants were presented with a single word in color on a trial and were asked to make a keypress response identifying either the print color or the word of the stimulus. The Stroop stimulus was always preceded by a warning signal, valid or invalid, conveying to the participant the likely location of the to-be-presented target.
Because prototypical demonstrations of the Stroop effect (cf. MacLeod, 1991) entail long stimulus exposure, in the first experiment of the current study we sought to produce Stroop or reverse Stroop effects with the very short stimulus exposures required by Posner's cost-benefit design. In Experiment 2, we used Posner's cost-benefit paradigm with the Stroop stimuli appearing in validly cued and invalidly cued (peripheral) locations. We calculated the costs and benefits to performance wrought by advance cueing. We also gauged Garner and Stroop effects at both cued and noncued locations. In Experiment 3, we calculated both classes of measures for centrally presented stimuli.
Would Stroop and Garner effects remain invariant across spatially attended and unattended loci? Based on the holistic approach to selective attention, we expected that they would not. Larger Stroop effects are expected to emerge in spatially attended than in spatially unattended locations. As we mentioned, all the models developed within the holistic tradition agree that attention affects its subject as a unit, whether it is space-bounded features, objects, or object files. Consequently, all stimulus dimensions in the attended whole are afforded enhanced processing. Because the latter applies to the irrelevant dimension as potently as to the relevant dimension, larger Stroop effects at attended than at unattended locations were expected.
Another space-based consideration relates to the semantic origin of the Stroop effect. The Stroop effect is engendered by semantic processing-reading-of the irrelevant word in spite of the instructions calling upon the participant to ignore it and attend to the color print instead. Put conversely, "people ... must process the word to some extent or Stroop interference would not occur at all" (MacLeod, 1996, p. 81) . According to one class of holistic models, selection is said to be made prior to semantic analysis. Hence, the semantic attributes of unattended stimuli undergo little processing and, consequently, do not really influence the perceptual responses (Underwood, 1976) . Early-selection theorists (e.g., Broadbent, 1982; Kahneman, 1973; Neisser, 1967; Posner, 1980; Treisman & Gelade, 1980) , would (did), thus, predict miniscule Stroop effects for unattended color-word stimuli. The opposing view, lateselection theory (e.g., Deutch & Deutch, 1963; Duncan, 1980; Shaw, 1984; Shiffrin & Gardner, 1972) , assumes that perceptual and semantic analyses occur preattentively, with selection required for further processing that shapes the overt response. Although late-selection theory allows for Stroop effects to emerge in unattended locations, their attenuation is still the natural prediction of this class of models.
According to the information conception, in contrast, no substantial differences are expected to obtain between attended and unattended stimuli, because, in both conditions, selective attention depends on the ability to ignore changes in the irrelevant dimension. That ability, in turn, is a function of relative dimensional discriminability. When the dimensions match, selective attention should be good with Stroop and Garner effects vanishing. When the dimensions mismatch, the more discriminable dimension should interfere with performance on the less discriminable dimension, for both attended and unattended trials.
Finally, consider the possible relations between Posner's index of attentional gain and those developed by Stroop and Garner. Assume that performance is affected by both (a) benefits and costs wrought by spatial cueing and (b) Stroop and Garner effects wrought by variation on irrelevant attributes. The question is whether the two classes of measures are interrelated or independent. If the former, then the research programs developed by Posner and Garner refer, at least partially, to the same concept. If the latter, then the respective research programs tap separate systems or networks of attention (cf. Posner & Raichle, 1994) .
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to demonstrate occurrence of Stroop and reverse Stroop effects under the minimal conditions used in this study: extremely short stimulus presentations and manual, keypress, responding. In Experiment la, the color words red and orange were printed each in the colors red and orange to yield four color-word combinations. In Experiment lb, we used the color words red and green and the corresponding colors red and green to generate the four stimuli. We selected the color words and print colors such that the classifications along both dimensions would be easier in Experiment lb than in Experiment la. In a control condition, Experiment lc, the neutral words nut and bulb appeared each in the colors red and green.
On a trial, a single color-word stimulus appeared for 30 ms in the same, precued, central position. Because the stimulus always appeared in the expected location it was invariably attended (in the Posnerian spatial sense). The task for the participant was to classify the Stroop stimulus on the relevant dimension, color or word, specified in advance by the experimenter. We measured the time and accuracy of the speeded classification responses. For color, the participants had to press a different key for each color and ignore trial-to-trial variation in word. For word, the participants had to make a different response for each word but ignore variation on irrelevant color. In Experiments la and lb, for two stimulus combinations the values of color and word matched, and for two they mismatched. In these experiments, we gauged the Stroop effect by calculating the difference in performance between con-gruent (color and word matching) and incongruent (color and word mismatching) stimuli. Experiment lc included no congruent or conflicting stimuli, therefore no Stroop congruity is defined for that condition. Nevertheless, Experiment lc served as our control condition to show that any Stroop effect found in Experiments la and lb derives from the semantic processing (i.e., reading) of the words of the Stroop stimuli used.
Finally, a comment is warranted to explain the contrived nature of Experiment 1. First, we used manual responding, a response mode known to produce smaller Stroop effects than do vocal responses (MacLeod, 1991) . Second, we used a very small stimulus set size, a context known to produce smaller Stroop effects than do larger sets of stimuli (e.g., Sabri, 1998; Williams, 1977) . Third, we used very short stimulus exposures, a condition that was bound to limit the magnitude of any Stroop effect that does obtain. Therefore, we designed Experiment 1 to minimize the chances of unearthing significant amounts of Stroop effects pertaining to the stimuli presented. We thus set an extremely conservative yardstick to test our notion of semantic processes affecting a small set of briefly presented signals. If Stroop effects do emerge under such inauspicious conditions, then we gain confidence that intrastimulus processes of structure and meaning operate under circumstances that prevail when the Posnerian orienting system is active. If Stroop effects obtain, then the Garnerian and Posnerian systems can be compared-the main burden of this study-and the minimal conditions used actually enhance the ecological validity of the current research.
Method
Participants. The participants were 16 undergraduate men and women from Bar-Ilan University who were paid to participate. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and apparatus. In an experimental condition, the four stimuli alternated randomly from trial to trial. The participants classified the stimuli, while timed, on the criterial dimension by pressing the appropriate key on the computer keyboard. Classifications of words and colors were performed in separate blocks, each block entailing 144 trials.
Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by a specifically prepared software on an IBM (PC-386) compatible microcomputer. A chin rest was used to stabilize viewing distance at 52 cm, such that 1 cm comprised 1.1 degree of visual angle. Each word subtended 1.45 degrees of visual angle in length and 0.55 degree in width. All words were centered horizontally, such that the midpoint of each word coincided with the horizontal coordinate of the fixation point.
Procedure. The participants were tested individually in a dimly lit room. Each participant performed in three color and three wordclassification tasks included in Experiments la, lb, and lc. The color and the word-classification tasks were performed as a set, with half the participants first performing the color tasks and half first performing the reading tasks. Within each set, order of testing was randomly varied. Prior to performing a particular task, the participants performed the entire set of trials of that task as practice. Trials were presented randomly subject to the proviso that no more than three stimuli with the same correct response appeared in a sequence. Intervals of approximately 2 min separated the various tasks.
Each trial consisted of the following sequence. Two small + signs, flanking the location of the subsequent target stimulus, were presented for 1 s to mark the (central) fixation area. A blank screen then appeared for 100 ms, followed by the target stimulus presented at the center of the display for 30 ms. The participant initiated the first trial by pressing any key on the computer keyboard. An interval of 0.5 s followed each response. Classifications were made by pressing either a right-or a left-hand key on the keyboard. Key assignment to the stimulus values was balanced across participants. RT was measured in milliseconds using a software timer.
The participants were instructed to attend to the relevant dimension and ignore irrelevant variation. They were encouraged to respond quickly but accurately. Each block of trials began with the presentation of the four stimuli for an unlimited viewing time. When the participant decided that he or she was ready to begin the experiment, the corresponding instructions for that block of trials followed.
Data analysis. We removed from the analysis trials with extreme latencies-those exceeding two standard deviations on either side of the mean. As a result, 4.7% of the color trials and 4.3% of the word trials were excluded. The correlation between speed and accuracy (averaged across participants) was calculated separately for each criterial dimension. In Experiment 1, the speed-accuracy correlation was -0.009 for classification of word and -0.052 for classification of color, suggesting no trade-off between the two measures of performance.
Results and Discussion
Mean RTs and proportions of correct responses for classifications of color and word appear in Table 1 . Consider first the overall means calculated across the data of Experiments la, lb, and lc. Average classification performance was 408.7 ms for color and 440.3 ms for word, indicating unequal difficulty of the two tasks. The 31.6-ms difference in performance favoring color was significant, F(l, 15) = 6.63, MSE = 7461.49, p = 0.021. Overall, accuracy was also better for color than for word (by 0.8%), although not significantly so. Commensurate with our selection of stimulus values, performance in Experiment la was worse by 30 ms and 0.9% than that in Experiment lb. In both of these Stroop experiments, color was, again, the easier-to-classify dimension (by 21 ms in both experiments), F(l, 15) = 2.87, MSE = 2,2762.92, p = 0.11, in Experiment la, and, F(l, 15) = 2.30, MSE = 1,2075.07, p = 0.15, in Experiment lb. Given those results, showing difficulty of the two tasks to be mismatched in favor of color, one should expect the reverse of the classic Stroop effect to emerge. Color (the easier-to-classify dimension) should intrude on classification of word (the more difficult dimension) more than vice versa (e.g., Algom et al., 1996; Melara & Mounts, 1993) . The data on selective attention to word and color, the main burden of this experiment, bear out these predictions.
Selective attention was gauged by Stroop congruity, defined as the difference in performance between congruent stimuli (in which Note. % C = percent correct; RT = reaction time; Exp. = experiment.
the word and color matched) and incongruent stimuli (in which the word and color mismatched). Table 2 summarizes these results. In Experiment la, for classification of word, congruent stimuli were responded to faster than incongruent stimuli by 25 ms, defining a significant reverse Stroop effect, F(l, 15) = 6.70, MSE = 1,469.1, p = 0.02. For classification of color, by contrast, congruent stimuli were responded to faster than incongruent stimuli by a mere 9 ms, an insignificant difference, F(l, 15) = 1.17, MSE = 1,043.76, p = 0.30. Accuracy was higher for congruent than for incongruent stimuli for both word (1.3%) and color (1.7%), but neither effect was significant, F < 1, for word; F(l, 15) = 1.45, MSE = 0.003, p = 0.25, for color.Therefore, our participants suffered interference from conflicting color when reading words, but did not suffer interference from conflicting word when judging colors. Selective attention was good for color but failed for word. The easier dimension intruded on performance with the more difficult dimension, but not vice versa.
In Experiment lb, for classification of word, responding to congruent stimuli was faster by 16 ms than responding to incongruent stimuli, but the difference did not amount to a significant reverse Stroop effect, F(l, 15) = 2.64, MSE = 1,433.6, p = 0.125. Similarly, for classification of color, a Stroop effect of 16 ms was not quite significant, F(l, 15) = 3.01, MSE = 1,292.54, p = 0.10. Accuracy was better for congruent than for incongruent stimuli for classification of word (by 1.6%), but it was slightly worse for congruent than incongruent stimuli for classification of color (by 0.9%). However, neither of these effects was statistically significant, F(l, 15) = 2.18, MSE = 0.0014, p = 0.161, for word; F(l, 15) = 1.19, MSE = 0.0012, p = 0.293, for color. Thus, in Experiment lb, the participants suffered no significant interference from variation along the irrelevant dimension, whether color or word, when classifying the stimuli on the relevant dimension. Selective attention was fairly good for both color and word, the 21-ms difference in performance favoring color notwithstanding. In Experiment lc, a control condition, average classification performance was 395 ms for color and 438 ms for word, again indicating unequal difficulty of the two tasks, F(l, 15) = 7.18, MSE = 16,913.98, p = 0.017. Accuracy was also better for color than for word (by 2.2%), yet this difference was not significant, F(l, 15) = 1.85, MSE = 0.0161, p = 0.193. The color task proved easier than the reading task throughout Experiment 1; the mismatch determined the magnitude and direction of the Stroop interference obtained when colors and words were cast to form corresponding and conflicting stimuli (Experiments la and lb).
The collective results of Experiment 1 are best understood within the framework of the informational approach to selective attention advocated by Melara and Algom (1996; Algom et al., 1996; Melara & Mounts, 1993 Pansky & Algom, 1999) . When colors are more discriminable than words-the case in Experiment 1-they intrude more on classification of words than do words on classification of colors. A reverse Stroop effect readily ensued (Experiment la). When the two dimensions roughly matched (Experiment lb), selective attention was fairly good, with Stroop effects less pronounced. Our results underscore the malleability of the Stroop effect; its direction and magnitude seem to depend lawfully on the relative discriminability of the constituent dimensions.
The emergence of a (reverse) Stroop effect in the data of Experiment la is noteworthy. It shows that semantic processing of words (i.e., reading) and consequent Stroop interference do occur under the short stimulus exposures used in this study. The Stroop effect obtained is also notable given two further conservative constraints: keypress responding and the relative ease with which the tasks were performed (note the speedy RTs and the high rates of accuracy).
In Experiment 1, location was held constant, and we examined the effect on attention of dimensional relations (i.e., whether the stimulus values corresponded or conflicted across the color and word dimensions). In Experiment 2, we manipulated attention spatially in addition to manipulating it informationally by randomly varying values along an irrelevant dimension. On each trial, we oriented the participant to expect one of two possible locations of the stimulus (on either the left or right of fixation). At each location, we monitored the consequences of dimensional variation by gauging the respective Stroop and Garner effects. Therefore, our goal in Experiment 2 was to explore the effect on Stroop interference of spatial attention (defined by the difference in performance to stimuli at expected and unexpected locations). Selective attention to stimulus features is determined by intrastimulus dimensional processing. Selective attention to the stimulus as a whole is determined, instead, by cross-stimulus processing, by selectively allocating resources to privileged locations or objects in the visual field. The former is commensurate with the informational approach to selective attention, the latter with the spatial approach. In Experiment 2 we combined both traditions. Hence, in Experiment 2 we asked whether the Stroop effect-measuring selective attention to privileged stimulus dimensions-differs for spatially attended and spatially unattended color-word stimuli.
Experiment 2
In this experiment, we manipulated spatial attention by the advance presentation of a brief peripheral cue to the right or left of fixation. On 75% of the trials the cue was valid, namely, it was followed by the target Stroop stimulus at an adjacent peripheral location (attended trials). On the remaining 25% of the trials the cue was invalid, namely, it was followed by the Stroop stimulus appearing at the opposite and, hence, unexpected location (unattended trials).
The task for the participant was the same as in Experiment 1: Regardless of location (or expectancy), he or she had to classify, while timed, the Stroop stimuli on the relevant dimension. We tested classification performance of word and color in the full Garnerian regimen, using baseline, filtering, and correlated dimensions tasks. Our purpose was twofold. First, we sought to determine whether Stroop and Garner effects emerge for the current, briefly presented, peripheral stimuli. Second, and more important, we sought to determine whether the effects differ for spatially attended and spatially unattended stimuli.
Method
Participants. The participants were 16 undergraduate men and women from Bar-Ilan University, who were paid to participate. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None had participated in Experiment 1.
Stimuli and apparatus. Each color word (red, orange) appeared in each color (red or orange) to form four combinations of color and word. From these stimuli, we created 10 experimental tasks, 5 involving classification of color and 5 involving classification of word. Thus, for color classification, the participants performed in two baseline tasks of 64 trials each (with word held constant at either red or orange), in two correlateddimensions tasks of 64 trials each (with values of color and word correlated positively or negatively), and in a filtering task of 128 trials (with irrelevant word varying orthogonally). The participants also performed in five complementary tasks, classifying word. A brief description of the tasks follows.
Baseline. The participants discriminated between two values on a dimension (say, whether the color was red or orange), whereas the other dimension was held at a constant value (e.g., the word red always appeared).
Filtering. The participants were presented with all four combinations (red-red, rerf-orange, orange-orange, and orange-red), alternating randomly from trial to trial, and classified each stimulus on color, or, in a different block, on word.
Positively correlated dimensions. The stimulus set comprised only two stimuli as in baseline. However, in this condition, both stimuli were congruent (the word red in red and the word orange in orange only appeared, alternating randomly across trials). The participants classified color in one block and word in another.
Negatively correlated dimensions. The participants classified values from the two incongruent stimuli (the word red in orange and the word orange in red), on either color or word.
Stimulus presentation and data collection were controlled by an IBM (PC-386) compatible microcomputer. A cliin rest was used to stabilize the viewing distance at 52 cm so that 1 cm represented 1.1 degrees of visual angle. Each word subtended 1.45 degrees of visual angle in length and 0.55 degree in width. All the words were horizontally centered so that the midpoint of each word corresponded to the horizontal coordinate of the fixation point.
Procedure. The participants performed the five color and five wordclassification tasks together as a set, with half of the participants first performing in the color tasks and half first performing in the word tasks. Within each block, 75% of the stimuli were attended (preceded by a valid or adjacent cue), and 25% were unattended (preceded by an invalid or remote cue). Of each class of stimuli, half were presented at 2.53 degrees to the right of fixation (measured from the inner end of the word), and half were presented at 2.53 degrees to the left of fixation (the inner end of the word). The various trials, attended and unattended, were randomly intermixed in a block, subject to the proviso that no more than two unattended trials or four trials with the same response appear in a sequence. The spatial cue consisted of a small open circle and was presented at the peripheral side of one of the two possible stimulus locations. The circle subtended a visual angle of 0.5 degree in diameter, and was presented at 5.27 degrees to the right or left of fixation. The advanced cue and the target stimulus were separated by 0.79 degree measured from the outer end of the word. Each trial entailed (a) a 1-s presentation of the two fixation marks in the center, followed by (b) the presentation of the peripheral cue for 80 ms, followed, in turn, by (c) an interval of 40 ms of blank screen, preceding (d) the presentation of the peripheral Stroop stimulus for 30 ms. Prior to each experimental block, there was a familiarization period involving the four stimuli as in Experiment 1. A 16-trial practice block preceded each of the 10 tasks. All the other procedures used were those of Experiment 1.
Data analysis. We again removed from the analysis trials with extreme latencies-those exceeding two standard deviations on either side of the mean. As a result, 3.8% of the color trials and 3.6% of the word trials were excluded. The correlation between speed and accuracy (averaged across participants) was calculated separately for each criterial dimension. In Experiment 2, the speed-accuracy correlation was 0.009 for classification of word and 0.009 for classification of color, suggesting no trade-off between the two measures of performance. Notably, responding took longer in the current experiment than in Experiment 1-means of 437.5 ms and 452 ms for attended and unattended trials, respectively, in Experiment 2, compared with a mean of 421 ms in Experiment 1, in which all the trials were attended. Accuracy also was worse in this experiment than in Experiment 1-rates of 93.9% and 91.8% for attended and unattended trials in Experiment 2 versus 98% for the attended stimuli of Experiment 1. These results enhance the validity of the procedures used. The deterioration of performance in Experiment 2 reflects the cost incurred by presenting the stimuli peripherally and, in one quarter of the trials, in an unexpected location.
Results and Discussion
Garner analyses. Table 3 provides a summary of the mean performance (speed and accuracy of responding) in the various experimental tasks, calculated separately for spatially attended and unattended trials. Consider first the set of results obtained for the attended trials. For RT, average baseline performance was 460 ms for classification of word and 411 ms for classification of color. Our participants responded to color with word held constant a full 49 ms faster than they did to word with color held constant, F(l, 15) = 66.02, MSE = 9,087.59, p = 0.0001. Color, thus, proved an easier dimension to classify than word, reproducing the same mismatch in discriminability observed in Experiment 1. Consider next the quality of selective attention to word and color. For both dimensions, responding took longer in filtering (in which the irrelevant dimension varied orthogonally) than at baseline (in which the irrelevant dimension was held constant), betraying the failure of selective attention. However, the two dimensions differed in the magnitude of impairment to selective attention wrought by random variation of values on the irrelevant dimension. The cost to performance incurred by irrelevant variation was 22 ms for classification of word, but 11 ms for classification of color, with only the former value of Garner interference statistically significant, F(l, 15) = 9.53, MSE = 762.4, p = 0.008. Therefore, in accord with the approach advocated by Melara and Algom and their associates (Melara & Mounts, 1993; Algom et al., 1996) , relative baseline discriminability engendered a substantial influence on the success of selective attention to the constituent dimensions. Classification of word was disrupted by irrelevant variation in print color, but classification of color was less affected by intrusions from irrelevant word. In the positively correlated dimensions task, a task entailing only congruent stimuli, performance improved considerably for classification of word, with participants reaping a redundancy gain of 25 ms (the mean difference in responding between the positively correlated dimensions task and the baseline task), a highly significant improvement, F(l, 15) = 8.51, MSE = 1,149.2, p = 0.01. For negatively correlated dimensions, a redundancy gain of 9 ms was not significant (F < 1). For the easier task of classifying color, the participants did not reap gain for positively correlated dimensions, but suffered a 17-ms interference in the negatively correlated dimensions task, F(l, 15) = 3.76, MSE = 1,124.8, p = 0.07. The linguistic conflict associated with the latter task exacted a toll on performance for the easier classification of color.
The accuracy data largely mirrored the RT data, although the effects were somewhat less pronounced. Thus, baseline performance was plagued by fewer errors in classifying color than in classifying word (by 2.3%), F(l, 15) = 4.95, MSE = 0.018, p = 0.042. The imbalance in difficulty favoring color again dictated different amounts of Garner interference for color and word. Thus, accuracy deteriorated in the filtering task by 3% for word, F(l, 15) = 9.07, MSE = 0.001, p = 0.009, but by an insignificant 0.6% for color, F(l, 15) = 1.62, MSE = 0.0005, p = 0.22. Therefore, irrelevant variation in print color disrupted classification performance for word, but irrelevant variation in word hardly intruded on classification performance for color. The more discriminable dimension intruded on performance with the less discriminable dimension much more than vice versa.
For classification of words, the participants reaped a 1.4% redundancy gain, F(l, 15) = 1.14, MSE = 0.003, p = 0.30, when the dimensional values corresponded (in the positively correlated dimensions task), but they neither reaped gain nor suffered interference when the dimensional values conflicted (in the negatively correlated dimensions task). For color, performance in the positively correlated dimensions task was on a par with that in the baseline task, but the participants suffered interference in the negatively correlated task (by 1.7%), F(l, 15) = 2.81, MSE = 0.002, p = 0.11.
Consider now the parallel class of results obtained for the subset of unattended trials-trials in which the Stroop stimulus appeared in an unexpected spatial location. Invalid spatial cueing exacted a toll on performance, rendering responding slower by 14.5 ms (Ms = 437.5 and 452 ms for spatially attended and unattended trials, respectively), a highly significant difference, F(l, 15) = 41.70, MSE = 752.4, p < 0.0001. Accuracy was also worse for unattended than for attended trials by 1.95% (Ms = 93.9% and 91.8% for attended and unattended trials), the difference, again, is statistically significant, F(l, 15) = 8.52, MSE = 0.008, p = 0.01. Apart from the toll on speed and accuracy wrought by false spatial cueing, the results collected for the unattended trials closely mimic those obtained for the attended trials. On average, augmenting RT and error rate by 14.5 ms and 1.95%, respectively, the data in the right half of Table 3 faithfully reproduces those in the left half. As a result, the major effects reported for attended trials reappear for the unattended trials.
For the unattached data, too, baseline classification was faster for color than for word (Ms = 423 and 472 ms, respectively); the 49-ms difference was highly significant, F(l, 15) = 28.60, MSE = 21,464.22, p < 0.0001. The participants classified stimuli on either dimension somewhat faster at baseline (in which the other dimension was held constant) than in filtering (in which the other dimension varied orthogonally). Garner interference was 18 ms for word and 16 ms for color, with the former only approaching statistical significance, F(l, 15) = 3.69, MSE = 1,245.1,p = 0.07, for word; F(l, 15) = 2.59, MSE = 1,490.3, p = 0.13, for color. For the more demanding task of classifying word, the participants reaped redundancy gain for both of the correlated dimensions tasks (gains of 22 and 16 ms, respectively, for positively and negatively correlated dimensions), F(l, 15) = 4.98, MSE = 1,370.6, p = 0.04, for the former, and, F(l, 15) = 3.25, MSE = 1,262.5, p = 0.09, for the latter. For classification of color, the negatively correlated dimensions task only yielded an appreciable amount of interference (35 ms), F(l, 15) = 8.68, MSE = 2,242.7, p = 0.01.
For the unattended trials, too, the accuracy data largely mirrored the RT data. At baseline, color classification was more accurate than word classification by 2.9%; however, the difference was not significant, F(l, 15) = 1.45, MSE = 0.174, p = 0.25. Unlike RT, we detected no significant amounts of Garner interference for either word or color (for the latter, performance was actually better in filtering than at baseline by 1.4%, F < 1). For word, the participants reaped redundancy gain for positively correlated dimensions (3.7%), F(l, 15) = 2.32, MSE = 0.01, p = 0.15, but they performed on a par with baseline for negatively correlated dimensions. For color, performance in neither of the correlated dimensions tasks differed significantly from that at baseline.
Stroop analyses.
Let us next examine Stroop interference, our second major indicator of selective attention (indeed, its failure) to stimulus dimensions. Stroop interference, or Stroop congruity, is defined as the difference in performance between congruent stimuli (in which the color and word match) and incongruent stimuli (in which the dimensional values mismatch). Three measures in the current Gamerian design satisfy this definition. First, consider the baseline task in which the irrelevant dimension is held at a constant value. That arrangement results in exactly half of the stimuli being congruent, the other half incongruent. In the filtering task, both dimensions varied orthogonally, again resulting in equal number of congruent and incongruent stimuli. Gauging the difference in performance between the two classes of stimuli provides for two measures of Stroop congruity, one at baseline and one in filtering. Finally, recall that the positively correlated dimensions task only includes congruent stimuli, and the negatively correlated dimensions task only includes conflicting stimuli. The difference in performance between the two tasks provides for yet a third measure of Stroop congruity. Note that the last measure is a between-task index of the Stroop effect, whereas the former two are intratask measures. We gauged the Stroop effect by calculating all of the three measures, separately for color and word, and across spatially attended and unattended stimuli. A dozen measures of the Stroop effect ensued for RT, and another dozen for accuracy. The collective results are presented in Table 4 .
Consider first the subset of data collected for the majority of trials in which the Stroop stimulus appeared in an expected peripheral location. For the attended color-word stimuli, our participants responded faster and more accurately for congruent than for For classification of color, too, Stroop effects emerged in each task as participants classified stimuli matched for word and color faster and less erroneously than they did stimuli mismatched for word and color. For RT, fairly large and significant Stroop effects characterized the correlated dimensions and baseline tasks (16 ms and 7 ms, respectively), F(l, 15) = 8.57, MSE = 1,666.1, p = 0.001, and, F(l, 15) = 5.46, MSE = 1,367.6,p = 0.034. None of the other Stroop effects, though, were significant, whether for speed or accuracy. Notably, in the filtering task, Stroop effects of 11 ms and 0.5% both fell short of statistical significance.
Our approach implicates mismatched baseline discriminability of the two dimensions as the source of the asymmetry in Stroop congruity observed across the crucial filtering tasks. The Stroop effects obtained for speed and accuracy were significant when the participants were classifying words, but both were insignificant when the participants were classifying colors. Recall that, for the current Stroop stimuli, colors were more discriminable than words at baseline. Consequently, the gain reaped from corresponding values of color and word and the loss incurred from conflicting values of color and word (the differences defining the Stroop effect) were more pronounced for the difficult task of word than for the easier task of color. Performance in the filtering tasks, in particular, evinced reverse Stroop effects (with corresponding color facilitating and conflicting color impairing performance with relevant word) more than classical Stroop effects (with irrelevant words less affecting performance with color). The pattern observed with Garner interference largely (though, perhaps, not fully) reappeared for Stroop interference. Gauged by performance at filtering, the more discriminable dimension of color engendered greater effects of Stroop than did the less discriminable dimension of word.
Consider next performance in the smaller subset of trials that entailed Stroop stimuli appearing in unexpected spatial locations. To anticipate, for the unattended Stroop stimuli, too, the results largely reproduced those obtained for the attended stimuli. For both speed and accuracy, our participants performed better with congruent than with incongruent stimuli even when the stimuli were preceded by an invalid spatial cue. For classification of word, the more difficult dimension, fairly large amounts of Stroop congruity obtained in all but one case. However, the effects were only significant in the filtering task. For filtering, the Stroop effects of 21 ms and 8.4% were both significant, F(l, 15) = 4.36, MSE = 6,812.4, p = 0.05, for RT, and, F((l, 15) = 12.56, MSE = 0.036, p = 0.003, for accuracy.
For the easier classification of color, Table 4 shows an appreciable Stroop effect obtained in each task for both measures of performance. For correlated dimensions, in particular, the large Stroop effect of 39 ms was significant, F(l, 15) = 7.42, MSE = 9,560.5, p = 0.016. In the filtering task, no Stroop effect obtained for speed (the 9 ms congruity was not significant), but a highly significant effect of 6.7% obtained for accuracy, F(l, 15) = 7.81, MSE = 0.037, p = 0.014.
Gauged by performance in filtering, the asymmetry in Stroop congruity favoring color reappeared for the unattended trials as well. Stroop effects plagued performance in classifying words somewhat more than they did classification performance with color. The more discriminable dimension of color engendered appreciable Stroop effects in classification of word. Classification of color was also affected by corresponding or conflicting word, but perhaps to a lesser extent. Therefore, for unattended trials, too, reverse Stroop effects were a bit more pronounced than classical Stroop effects.
The effect of spatial attention. We mentioned the results of the Posnerian cost-benefit analysis: Responding was speedier and less erroneous (by 14.5 ms and 1.95%, respectively) for spatially attended than for spatially unattended stimuli. Valid advanced cueing aided performance, misleading cues harmed it. Nevertheless, Tables 3 and 4 show that the intrastimulus dimensional interactions were largely the same for the two classes of trials. The same pattern of Garner and Stroop interference characterized spatially attended and spatially unattended stimuli. Stroop and Garner effects were slightly greater for word than for color for both attended and unattended stimuli. In Figure 1 , we present a direct comparison of the various Garner and Stroop effects obtained for speed of responding. In Figure 2 , we provide the same comparison for accuracy of responding.
The most striking result to remerge from this experiment-the close correspondence in magnitude of the Stroop interference between attended and unattended stimuli-is readily apparent from the summary comparisons provided in Figures 1 and 2 . A glance at the data depicted in Figure 1 , in particular, betrays the substantial correspondence of Stroop and Garner effects under attention and inattention. Regardless of the absolute values of interference obtained, when a particular measure is great or small for attended stimuli, so it is for unattended stimuli. A wealth of statistical analyses support the results of the visual inspection. First, in the omnibus analyses of variance, we did not find a significant interaction of spatial attention and stimulus congruity, F < 1, for RT, and, F(l, 15) = 3.49, p = 0.08, for accuracy. The lack of this interaction in the data is noteworthy because the same analyses yielded significant main effects for spatial attention (reported earlier as the result of the Posnerian cost-benefit analysis). Therefore, attended trials engendered faster and more accurate responding than unattended trials, yet congruent and incongruent stimuli instigated the same performance asymmetry for both classes of trials.
Additional analyses support the comparability of the Stroop and Garner effects obtained for spatially attended and spatially unattended stimuli. For each effect of Garner and Stroop in the various tasks, we performed a separate comparison of the respective magnitudes obtained for attended and unattended stimuli (across the individual participants). Notably, in 9 of the 10 t tests performed we did not find a significant effect of spatial attention, for RT, 0.30 < f (15) Conversely, when dimensional selectivity is good for attended stimuli, it is similarly good for unattended stimuli. Indeed, the correlation between attended and unattended Stroop and Garner effects amounted to 0.77 (df = 11, p = 0.04) for RT and 0.46 (df = 11, p = 0.13) for accuracy.
Theoretical implications. The juxtaposition of dimensional (expressed by Stroop and Garner effects) and spatial (expressed by Posnerian cost-benefit effects) modes of selective attention yielded results of primary theoretical importance. Of particular interest is the appreciable amounts of Stroop and Garner effects observed for unattended color-word stimuli (as large indeed as those obtained for the same stimuli in attended locations). One should realize that Stroop effects, classic or reverse, only arise as a result of semantic processing-reading-of the stimuli. Semantic processing of the colored words-engaging their meaning-is absolutely necessary for a Stroop effect to emerge. Had our participants treated the words as mere shapes, the linguistically derived classes of congruent and incongruent stimuli would have carried no consequence for performance, and, hence, Stroop effects would have vanished. The Stroop effects observed for the current unattended stimuli thus betray considerable semantic processing of these stimuli. The upshot is clear: Stimuli are afforded semantic analysis without attention (space-based or object-based), and semantic analysis is already present at preattentive stages of processing.
Consider again the stimuli used in the current experiment. They were color-word compounds presented to the periphery of the visual field for a mere 30 ms. For the minority of cases with false advance cueing, these stimuli also appeared in unexpected locations. Given those inauspicious conditions, the appearance of Stroop and Garner effects for the current stimuli is truly remarkable. The appearance of Stroop effects, for the unattended stimuli in particular, likely taps hitherto unsuspected reservoirs of instantaneous semantic processing. Recent findings from the visualsearch literature (e.g., Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Enns, 1990; Moore & Egeth, 1997; Wolfe, Friedman-Hill, & Bilsky, 1994; see, Goldsmith, 1998 , for a summary) indicate that the products of preattentive processing may be rather refined, even sophisticated. The current results, showing semantic processing of stimuli without attention (i.e., under conditions in which attention is focused on another stimulus or location; e.g., Rock & Guttman, 1981; Rock, Linnett, Grant, & Mack, 1992) , go beyond those findings, challenging widely accepted roles for attention (cf. Goldsmith, 1998) . If stimuli without attention are accorded the same semantic processing as attended stimuli (as measured by Stroop interference), then the role of attention in perceptual information processing must be subjected to a fresh scrutiny.
Stroop effects are the behavioral expressions of the linguisticsemantic conflict entailed in the color-word stimuli. Just like in logic, in which all the premises must refer to the same predicate for a contradiction (indeed for a conclusion) to ensue, so in psychology, values of the constituent color and word dimensions must inhere in the same "object," unit, or system for the conflict tapped by Stroop to emerge. If the color and word features of a Stroop display are not "glued" onto a single complex or stimulus (regardless of whether the components are spatially separated), they do not conflict psychologically or logically. For Stroop interference to arise, therefore, the participants must combine the color and word features to form a unified "object" in some sense of the term. Because Stroop effects obtained throughout the different conditions of the current experiment, our participants evidently conjoined the color and word features into units (say, into colored words) for both attended and unattended stimuli. Focused attention, thus, is not required for the integration of features to form objects. Therefore, the current results challenge the role assigned to focused attention in the great majority of space-based models. Our results are also incompatible with the strong emphasis on attention-based allocation of resources characteristic of spacebased views, to wit, "in models based on the notion of spotlight, attention is distributed in contiguous regions of the visual field. Stimuli that fall within this region are extensively processed, while events that occur outside this region are ignored" (Kramer & Jacobson, 1991, p. 267) . Clearly, our unattended stimuli fell outside of the spotlight, yet they were extensively processed. The current findings are more commensurate with the preattentive, object-based representations assumed, for instance, by attentional engagement theory (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989 , representations that are thought to be relatively sophisticated and structured.
Serendipitous validation. Classification performance in the current experiment was plagued by Stroop effects. Their appearance, in turn, attested to the depth of semantic processing accorded to the stimuli, attended and unattended. Those stimuli, let us mention once again, appeared peripherally for very brief exposure durations. Given the poor initial conditions for perceptual processing, preattentive or attentive, independent evidence for the semantic processing of the stimuli (apart from that provided by the Stroop effects observed) is extremely valuable. Fortuitously, such corroborative evidence is provided by virtue of the peripheral presentation of the stimuli. Hemispheric specificity entails differential processing by the two hemispheres of linguistic stimuli, with a general performance advantage preserved for the left hemisphere (i.e., for stimuli presented to the right visual field, RVF). If our participants treated the words of the Stroop displays as linguistic stimuli-read them (rather than responded to them as mere shapes)-then an RVF advantage in classification of words is expected. By contrast, for the nonlinguistic dimension of color, no hemispheric differences in performance are expected.
In the top panel of Figure 3 , we present the RT data, classified by dimension of judgment (color, word) and side of presentation (left, right). For classification of words, stimuli presented to the RVF were responded to 18 ms faster than stimuli presented to the left visual field. For classification of colors, no parallel hemispheric asymmetry was found, and, in point of fact, the means for stimuli at the two sides of presentation were equal. The Dimension X Side interaction was highly significant, F(l, 15) = 8.16, MSE = 9,982.6, p = 0.01, supporting the semantic analysis of the words presented. Notably, too, the Dimension X Side X Attention interaction was not significant (F < 1), indicating that early semantic processing applied equally well to attended and unattended stimuli.
In the bottom panel of Figure 3 , we present the complementary data on accuracy. Again, there was an appreciable asymmetry between the hemispheres in the accuracy of classifying words (an advantage of 2.8% for stimuli appearing in the RVF). We also observed a less pronounced difference in classifying colors (an advantage of 1.6% for stimuli appearing in the RVF). The Dimension X Side interaction was not significant, F(l, 15) = 1.25, p = 0.28, yet the pattern of results largely duplicated that obtained for the RT data. Therefore, the hemispheric dissociations observed authenticate the ubiquitous semantic processing of the current stimuli, attended and unattended.
In summary, the close match between the pattern of responses for spatially attended and unattended stimuli indicates that both were subjected to the same kind of intrastimulus dimensional analysis by the visual system. The results of the dimensional analysis, indexed by Stroop and Garner effects, showed that selective attention to stimulus dimensions failed (or succeeded) to the same extent for both types of stimuli. Although poorer perfor-mance obtained with spatially unattended than with spatially attended stimuli, performance in both cases was similarly affected by Stroop and Gamer interference. Indeed, the values of Stroop and Garner interference were comparable across spatial attention, and they correlated for the various experimental tasks. Because Stroop effects tap processes of semantic analysis and feature integration, our results imply that focused attention via a spatiotemporal "spotlight" or "window" is needed for neither the derivation of meaning nor a conjoined object representation. Our results attest instead to the operation of quite elaborate preattentive processes. On a deeper theoretical level, the dissociation of interobject spatial relations and intraobject dimensional relations implies a functional divide in types (or mechanisms) of selective attention used by the human cognitive system. The fact that the effects of trial-to-trial variation in spatial expectancy were completely disentangled from those of trial-to-trial variation in dimensional relations must be regarded as a nontrivial achievement by the cognitive system. Apparently, interobject and intraobject selective attention are independent processes harnessed by the human brain to aid in the instantaneous uncovering of significant information in the environment.
A final piece of evidence seems to be called for to fully substantiate our conclusions. In Experiment 2, the effects of spatial and dimensional attention were tested for peripheral stimuli. The parallels in dimensional attention between spatially attended and unattended stimuli were striking. Would the same results obtain for centrally presented stimuli? In Experiment 1, one might recall, we used centrally presented stimuli; however, all of the stimuli presented in that experiment were attended. Therefore, in Experiment 3 we used the methods and participants of Experiment 1 again, this time to examine performance with centrally presented, yet unattended, stimuli. We asked whether Stroop and Garner effects would plague performance with unattended stimuli presented at the center of the visual field.
Experiment 3
Recall the method of Experiment 1. A trial entailed advanced spatial cueing for 1 s, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms, at the end of which the target Stroop stimulus was presented for 30 ms. Note that, by this arrangement, the Stroop stimulus always appeared at the expected central location, therefore it was invariably attended (in the Posnerian spatial sense). The participant's task was to classify the color-word stimuli-centrally presented and attended throughout the experiment-on the relevant dimension.
In Experiment 3 we used the method of Experiment 1 with a single notable exception: The 100-ms interval following advance spatial cueing was not empty. It rather included the presentation of a peripheral cue telling the participant whether to respond to the central Stroop stimulus. For half the trials, the peripheral cue was positive (empty circle), directing the participant to proceed with speeded classification of the target stimulus; for the other half, the peripheral cue was negative (filled circle or empty square) directing the participant to ignore the subsequent color-word stimulus. For the latter trials, the participant was instructed to simply await the next trial without producing a response. We also introduced trial-to-trial uncertainty into the spatial location of the peripheral cue: It could appear above, below, to the left, or to the right of fixation across trials. Other than the content of the 100-ms interval (blank screen in Experiment 1, entailing a cue in Experiment 3) the procedures used in Experiment 3 were exact replicates of those of Experiment 1.
Our purpose in Experiment 3 was to present the Stroop stimuli centrally, yet to divert the attention of the participant away from those target stimuli nonetheless. The version of the dual-task paradigm used (cf. Pashler, 1990; Prinzmetal & Wilson, 1997 ) was meant to accomplish that goal. To conform with the experimental instructions, our participants had to (a) focus their attention on the peripheral cue (i.e., distract their attention from locus of the target stimulus) and (b) decide on the basis of the identity of the peripheral cue on their immediate course of action. The perceptual load thus created was bound to tax the attentional resources available for the main task of classification-the one requiring an actual response measured in the experiment. Put conservatively, the color-word stimuli presented centrally in Experiment 3 were less well-attended than the same stimuli in Experiment 1.
The task for the participant was that used in Experiments 1 and 2: to classify the Stroop stimuli on the relevant dimension, color or word, specified in advance by the experimenter. Based on the speeded classification performance, we measured the Stroop effect the same way as we did in Experiment 1. We calculated the difference in performance between congruent and incongruent stimuli. We asked whether unattended color-word stimuli presented to the center of the visual field would be affected by Stroop effects similar to those plaguing attended stimuli. In general, we were interested in further probing selective attention to stimulus dimensions in the face of inattention to the location of the stimulus as a whole.
Method
Participants. The 16 participants of Experiment 1 were recruited and paid to participate in this experiment. As a point of fact, a random half of the 16 persons first ran through the tasks of Experiment 3, then through the tasks of Experiment 1; the other half completed the experiments in the reverse order.
Stimuli and apparatus. We used the stimuli and viewing conditions of Experiment 1. The color words red and orange printed each in red and orange formed the four stimuli in Experiment 3a. The color words red and green printed each in red and green formed the stimuli in Experiment 3b. The neutral words nut and bulb each printed in the colors red and green made up the stimuli in Experiment 3c.
The one addition in this experiment was the presentation of a peripheral cue for the 100 ms following the + signs and preceding the color-word stimuli. The peripheral cue was an empty circle on half the trials and a filled circle or an empty square on a quarter of the trials each. The cue could appear in one of four possible locations: top, bottom, left-, or right-hand side of the screen. The cue subtended 0.7° of visual angle and was presented 8.0 degrees of visual angle above, below, to the left, or to the right of fixation. Cue identity and location were varied randomly across trials.
Procedure. We followed meticulously the procedures of Experiment 1. The same tasks of color and word classifications were used. The participant had to make a different response to each word or color when relevant and ignore trial-to-trial variation along the irrelevant dimension. Again, the addition of a peripheral cue introduced the single notable departure from the procedures of Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, the participants were additionally instructed to pay attention to the peripheral cue and classify the target Stroop stimulus if and only if the cue was an empty circle. Alternatively, if the target was preceded by a filled circle or an empty Note. % C = percent correct; RT = reaction time.
square, the participants were asked to refrain from responding to the color-word stimulus and get ready for the next trial. When participants either failed to detect an empty circle (i.e., did not respond to the Stroop stimulus when they had to classify it) or misidentified a filled circle or an empty square as an empty circle (i.e., responded to the Stroop stimulus when they were instructed to refrain from responding) they received a feedback tone for 0.5 s signaling their error. Data analysis. Our participants conformed remarkably well to the experimental instructions. They responded on 98% of the trials in which the advanced cue (empty circle) signaled subsequent responding. They refrained from responding on 97.8% of the trials in which the advanced cue (filled circle or empty square) called on them to ignore the to-be-presented stimulus.
We again removed from the analysis trials with extreme latenciesthose exceeding two standard deviations on either side of the mean. As a result, 4.7% of the color trials and 4.8% of the word trials were excluded. The correlation between speed and accuracy (averaged across participants) was calculated separately for each criterial dimension. In the current experiment, the speed-accuracy correlation was .07 for classification of word and -.13 for classification of color, suggesting no trade-off between the two measures of performance. Responding took longer in the present experiment than in Experiment 1-means of 723 ms in Experiment 3 compared with a mean of 421 ms in Experiment 1. Accuracy also was worse in this experiment than in Experiment 1-94.4% versus 98%, respectively. These results strengthen the validity of the procedure used. The impaired performance in Experiment 3 reflects the cost incurred by conditioning the response to the Stroop stimulus on the identification of the peripheral precue. Likely, the dual-task manipulation caused a notable decrease in the attentional resources available for the main task of classification.
Results and Discussion
Mean RTs and proportions of correct responses for classification of color and word appear in Table 5 . Average classification performance was 728 ms for color and 718 ms for word; the 10-ms difference in overall speed was not significant statistically (F < 1). The 0.1% difference obtained for accuracy was similarly insignificant (F < 1). For the individual Stroop experiments, word was classified faster and more accurately than color in both Experiments 3a and 3b. The respective values of the advantage for classification of word were 24 and 42 ms for speed, and 2.7% and 3.4% for accuracy. However, none of these values was statistically significant. The average results, thus, show word and color to be largely matched in difficulty, although we noted a trend toward better performance with word. Notably, the current procedure of driving attention away from the central stimulus took a heavy toll on performance. RT and error rate nearly doubled compared with those obtained in Experiment 1, in which the same stimuli were attended. For the unattended (or less well attended) stimuli of Experiment 3, mean RT was 723 ms, and errors amounted to 5.65% of the trials; the respective values for the attended stimuli of Experiment 1 were 425 ms and 2%.
Consider next selective attention to word and color. Table 6 summarizes the values of Stroop congruity obtained under the current conditions of attention diverted away from the centrally presented Stroop stimulus. In Experiment 3a, for classification of color, congruent stimuli were responded to faster than incongruent stimuli by 106 ms, defining a highly significant Stroop effect, F(l, 15) Therefore, in Experiments 3a and 3b, our participants suffered interference from conflicting meaning when classifying the print color of words. Selective attention failed for color, producing the Note. % C = percent correct; RT = reaction time. t.05 </> < .10. *p<.05. ***/>< .005. ****/?< .0005. typical Stroop effect. Conversely, our participants also suffered interference from conflicting color when judging the words, but this interference was smaller in magnitude. Nevertheless, given the reverse Stroop effects obtained, selective attention to word was also poor. As in Experiment 1, the easier dimension intruded on performance with the more difficult dimension more than vice versa. In Experiment 1, difficulty was mismatched in favor of color, and color intruded on performance with word. In Experiment 3, difficulty was mismatched a bit in favor of word, and words intruded on performance with colors more than did colors on performance with words.
Comparing the overall performance (of the same participants) in Experiments 1 and 3 yields the results of the Posnerian costbenefit analysis. As mentioned, the cost of inattention (or benefit of attention) was huge in the current case. Attending to the location of the central color-word stimulus (Experiment 1) improved classification of the color and word components by 302 ms and reduced errors by 3.6% compared with a condition (Experiment 3) in which attention as diverted away from the location of the Stroop stimulus. In general, the Stroop effects obtained, significant or insignificant, were much larger in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1. This observation is routine in the literature probing the Stroop effect: The longer the performance RTs, the larger the respective effects of Stroop. Percentage-wise, though, the significant effects of Stroop obtained in Experiments 1 and 3 were quite comparable: 6% in Experiment 1 versus 10% in Experiment 3. Most important for the present concerns, the large Stroop effects plaguing performance in Experiment 3 demonstrated that dimensional attention exerts its effects on performance over and beyond those of spatial attention to the stimulus as whole.
The results of Experiment 3, thus, complement those obtained in the previous experiments. They mandate the following four conclusions. First, the participants engaged the meaning of the words presented-read them-under the inauspicious conditions of Experiment 3: Attention diverted away from the location of a stimulus presented for a mere 30 ms. Had the participants failed to process the words semantically no Stroop effects would have ensued. Second, therefore, focused spatial attention is not necessary for the semantic processing of alphanumeric stimuli. Third, regardless of whether the color-word compound is attended, it is perceived to be an object, and additional resources are required for its decomposition into its constituent dimensions. Fourth, intrastimulus dimensional processing and interstimulus spatial or object processing are independent operations accomplished by the human cognitive system. The former attention mechanism affects behavior over and beyond the influence exerted by the latter attentional mechanism. Both are needed to provide a full account of human attentional capabilities.
General Discussion
The results of this study show that classification of both words and colors (of color-word compounds) was influenced by spatial attention. Performance was better for stimuli appearing in spatially attended than in spatially unattended locations. Simultaneously, semantic processing of the same Stroop stimuli was independent of spatial attention. As a result, Stroop and Garner effects affected performance to roughly the same extent on both spatially attended and unattended trials. The observed independence of spatial and dimensional attention is the signature of the current results. Incidentally, a recent study by Baldo, Shimamura, and Prinzmetal (1998) reported results that are compatible with the currently found dissociation. In one condition of their Stroop study, the target always appeared in the same location (and, hence, location was predictable), whereas in another condition the target appeared in one location on half of the trials and in another location on the other half (and, hence, location was unpredictable). Baldo et al. (1998) found that RTs were faster when the target location was predictable. However, predictability did not interact with any of the Stroop effects obtained and did not affect the overall pattern of data. That study mainly pursued stimulus-response compatibility in Stroop-like tasks, an issue unrelated to our concerns. Nevertheless, we find the agreement in outcome between Baldo et al.'s study and the present study notable. In the remainder of this discussion, we first describe the underlying characteristics that define the programs associated with Posner and Garner for studying attention. We conclude that they tap separate systems of attention. We then contrast the two systems, pinpointing what we believe to be their primary difference. We conclude by integrating the present behavioral data and conclusions with current electrophysiological data and conclusions suggested by Posner and his associates (Posner & Raichle, 1994) . The agreement between the latter and the current resolution is remarkable.
Let us try to elucidate the radical distinction that we are drawing between two popular frameworks that have been proposed to conceptualize attention. We call the first approach holistic, the second analytic. These terms refer to the platform and mode of attentional action hypothesized in the two approaches. The first class of models presumes that attention operates on chunks of stimulus input, whether the latter are defined by space, objects, or other organization principles. According to the second approach, attention deconstructs the stimulus complex into its components, acting on privileged dimensions. A representative but far from exhaustive list of the distinguishing characteristics of each approach follows.
The Holistic Approach to Attention
Three classes of models have largely defined this approach. They include Posner's visual orienting model, Treisman's feature integration theory, and Duncan's object-based model of attentional selection. The three theories differ, as a matter of fact, on a range of issues concerning attention, from procedures and measurement to means of attentional selection to temporal order and representational hierarchy. Yet they agree on the following essential idea. Attention operates in contiguous chunks, whether they are defined by physical proximity, objectness, movement, color, or any other physical (continuous) variable. The selected chunk is fully processed, whereas the rest of the visual input is subjected to deferred and less extensive processing. It is the assumption of mandatory processing of all aspects of the selected unit that defines this approach as holistic. It is also the assumption challenged by the alternative analytic approach.
In Posner's visual orienting model, space plays a primary role in controlling attention. Emphasis is placed on the benefits and costs associated with directing attention to particular locations in the visual field. When the stimulus occurs within the space illuminated by the attentional beam, performance improves. If the stimulus falls outside the space circumscribed by the attentional beam, performance declines. These effects have been interpreted in terms of the "spotlight" analogy (e.g., Broadbent, 1982; Posner et al., 1980; Tsal & Lavie, 1988) by which attention is distributed in contiguous regions of the visual field. The spotlight model is often refined, if not replaced, by the "zoom-lens" (e.g., C. W. Eriksen & Yeh, 1985) and gradient (e.g., Downing, 1988; LaBerge & Brown, 1986) analogies that stress the dynamic nature of visual attention and suggest that processing efficiency varies over the attentional field itself. C. W. Eriksen and his collaborators (e.g., B. A. Eriksen & C. W. Eriksen, 1974; C. W. Eriksen & Hoffman, 1972 , 1973 ; see also, C. W. Eriksen & St. James, 1986 ; C. W. Eriksen & Yeh, 1985) have further attempted to operationalize the spotlight analogy by measuring the spatial extent within which compatible and incompatible distractors effect gains and incur costs to performance. The value found, 1° of visual angle, has been interpreted as the minimal size of the attentional spotlight. In a similar vein, studies of divided attention (e.g., Hoffman & Nelson, 1981; Kramer, Wickens, & Donchin, 1985) have found performance to be superior for stimuli located in close spatial proximity. The upshot is clear: Regardless of the particular paradigm or metaphor used, models of visual orientation agree that, within the attended location in space, all stimuli are extensively processed.
Treisman's feature integration theory is also widely accepted to model attentional influences on performance. It is also a spacebased theory. Along with models that are more explicitly spacebased, feature integration theory shares the assumption that attention operates like a spotlight (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Gormican, 1988) or a window (Treisman & Sato, 1990 ) that (serially) selects particular locations in the visual field. A "master map of locations" (Treisman, 1988, p. 203) defines the boundaries of attentional selection. The theory explains the emergence of perceptual objects or object groupings as the end-product of the combinational processes operating within the spatial bounds of the attentional spotlight. Along with Posner's visual orienting model, Treisman's model also assumes that objects or stimuli are processed in terms of interitem groupings between spatially contiguous items. Most important for the present argument, the theory posits that all features present in the space circumscribed by focused attention are conjoined into object representations. Put in even stronger language, "if more than one object occupies a given location ..., all must be selected" (Goldsmith, 1998, p. 192, emphasis added) .
The third research program, entailing object-based models of attention, also emphasizes the role of attention in enhancing performance with the selected stimuli. Object-based models posit that the visual field is preattentively parsed into objects or perceptual groups defined by Gestalt principles such as contour, color, similarity, or movement. Hence, in object-based models, physical proximity is just one factor in the control of attention. In these models, a master map of specific feature-object representations replaces the master map of feature-location linkages associated with feature integration theory. Despite the lack of a consensual definition for the concept of "perceptual object" (cf. Duncan, 1984; Goldsmith, 1998; Logan, 1996) , the primary unit of selection for attentional processing is assumed to be precisely that of a perceptual object. Support for object-based models comes from reports of "same-object advantage" in tasks of divided attention with interitem distance held constant (e.g., Duncan, 1984; Goldsmith, 1998; Kramer & Jacobson, 1991; Lappin, 1967 ; see also Treisman, Kahneman, & Burkell, 1983) . Performance is best when all the information can be located on the same object. Conversely, performance improves if irrelevant (and conflicting) information and relevant information can be located on different objects (Kramer & Jacobson, 1991) . Most important for the current argument, "the focusing of attention on a particular object results in the mandatory processing of all attributes of that object" (Kramer & Jacobson, 1991, p. 268, emphasis added) .
We believe that there is a fundamental sense in which these models are alike, despite their surface dissimilarities. The models agree that the basic unit of attentional selection is a contiguous whole. The continuity may comprise mere physical proximity (as in space-based models), temporal contiguity (movement), or other physical dimensions (color and further Gestalt grouping factors, as in object-based models). However, regardless of the nature of the physical dimension(s) producing the theater of action for attentional forces to exert their influence, that theater always comprises a structured yet (initially) undifferentiated whole. In other words, for all the models discussed, the unit of selection for attention is a uniformly processed stimulus complex, whether defined by location or objectness. Consequently, it is uniformly asserted that all attributes of the continuous whole (i.e., space, object) are processed mandatorily, whereas events outside that complex are ignored or are processed serially. It is that view of the unit of attention that is questioned by the alternative analytic approach.
A fair amount of research has, of course, been directed toward contrasting the various models (rather than stressing their unity as we do have). For instance, Briand and Klein (1987; see also Briand, 1998) have posed the poignant question, "Is Posner's 'Beam' the same as Treisman's 'Glue'?" providing a partially affirmative answer (for exogenous but not endogenous cues beam and glue were similarly affected). More recently, it has become customary to cast object-based and space-based models in opposition, although the need for rapproachment is often expressed (e.g., Egly, Driver, & Rafal, 1994; Humphreys, Olson, Romani, & Riddoch, 1996; Logan, 1996) . The differentiation between objectbased and spaced-based models is complicated by the obvious fact that objects occur in space and that, typically, a pair of objects are separated by a longer distance than a pair of properties on a single object. Coupled with the lack of an adequate definition for "perceptual object," investigators are often forced to acknowledge that "the lines of demarcation between object-based and space-based views are not always clear" (Goldsmith, 1998, p. 190) .
A theoretical divide between space-based and object-based models of attention may not be tenable-even if the methodological problems are solved. For instance, feature integration theory, a space-based model, posits that all the features in a given attentional fixation are conjoined into a temporary object representation, or "object file" (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984) . This object representation provides the basis for subsequent object recognition and object-based processing (Treisman, 1988 (Treisman, , 1993 ; see also Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992) . Hence, Treisman's space-based model is "actually cast within a more general, object-based attentional framework" (Goldsmith, 1998, p. 191, emphasis added) . As Goldsmith's analysis shows, both object-based and space-based models engage "objects" as the basic unit of attentional processing. Goldsmith further demonstrates that, in a fundamental sense, both models are object-based. The models only differ on the temporal sequence of events. The question is whether "objects" are the primary means of selection or are established at some later stage along attentional processing. Relaxing requirements for a strict temporal and representational hierarchy (e.g., Grossberg, Mingolla, & Ross, 1994; Prinzmetal, Presti, & Posner, 1986 ) may lead to a more realistic assimilative approach (Goldsmith, 1998) .
Again, in contrast to the prevailing trend of pitting one model against the other (in particular, space-based and object-based theories), we wish to accentuate their essential similarity. We are more impressed by the foundational agreement of all holistic models on the nature of the unit of selection and the functional segregation of the visual field (into well-processed and less wellprocessed portions), than by the differences on temporal and physical detail. In our view, the problems that have beset the attempts at selecting any one model as superior were not coincidental. The models may have resisted a clear resolution not because of methodological difficulties, but simply because they are not very different after all.
The Analytic Approach to Attention
This approach is predicated on the seminal work of Garner and his colleagues (e.g., Garner, 1962 Garner, ,1970 Garner, ,1974 Garner, ,1981 Garner, ,1983 Garner & Felfoldy, 1970; Pomerantz & Garner, 1973 ; see also Lockhead & Pomerantz, 1991) . More recent work espousing this approach includes that by Melara (e.g., Melara, 1989 Melara, , 1992 Melara & Marks, 1990; Melara & Mounts, 1993) and Algom (e.g., Arieh & Algom, 1997; Pansky & Algom, 1999 ; see also Algom, 1992) . Recently developed models of multidimensional perception (Ashby, 1992) , and, in particular, general recognition theory (Ashby & Townsend, 1986; Kadlec & Townsend, 1992) , also bear conceptual affinity to Garner's approach.
The point of departure for the analytic approach is the trivial fact that virtually all the objects in our perceptual milieu are multidimensional. People are said to attend to the individual dimensions of these multidimensional objects. The issue of importance for attention is to determine how the different stimulus dimensions interact during perceptual processing. Note that, in Garner's approach, attention is directed to dimensions of experience and not to entire stimuli or continuous wholes. Selective attention to a stimulus dimension fails if one cannot ignore irrelevant variation occurring along the other stimulus dimensions. If selective attention fails, the dimensions are termed interacting dimensions. Conversely, selective attention succeeds if the individual dimensions can be processed independently. If variation along an irrelevant dimensions does not intrude on performance with the relevant dimension, then selective attention is perfect, and the dimensions are termed separable dimensions.
The Stroop phenomenon is a natural candidate to be tested within this approach as the task calls on participants to attend to one dimension of experience (say, word) while ignoring trial-totrial variation along another (color). The classic result is the failure of selective attention for color, but perfect selective attention for word. Although the robustness of this pattern of results has been challenged recently (e.g., Algom et al., 1996; Melara & Algom, 1996; Melara & Mounts, 1993 ; see also the results of the current study), the Stroop phenomenon comprises a prime example of the failure and success of selective attention under the Garnerian approach.
Although we did not use the procedures of general recognition theory (GRT) in our derivations of Garner and Stroop effects, important insights may be gained by applying GRT concepts to elucidate the current issues. For one, we found integrality (that is, significant Stroop and Garner interference) to hold in and out of Posner's spotlight. GRT analyses (on unspeeded data) further permit disentangling of perceptual from decisional integrality. Both may or may not hold in and out of the spotlight. In a similar vein, the distinction between perceptual and decisional processes could well explain why the Stroop effect is so easily manipulated by context. Because (a) the current study mainly concerns RTs, and (b) the filtering task used in this study is least vulnerable to decisional distortion, the distinction does not seriously threaten the validity of our conclusions. However, GRT-guided analyses offer exciting avenues for future research.
The generic Garnerian approach is analytic in the sense that attention subserves the ubiquitous tendency to deconstruct the stimulus, any stimulus, into its constituent dimensions. This human proclivity is eminently understandable, because, at a given time, people are usually interested in registering variation along a single-relevant-dimension of the (multidimensional) stimuli impinging on their senses. Put in general terms, humans are motivated to rest their subjective representations of the environment on the fundamental building blocks of perception-dimensions of experience. Of course, all physical dimensions are not also psychological dimensions (see, in particular, Ashby & Townsend, 1986 , for elucidating this important point). However, the dimensions that are noticed by the observer serve as the platform for attentional processing.
Analytic Versus Holistic Processes of Attention
The basic difference between the holistic and analytic approaches to attention concerns where order is sought: segregation of the visual field in one case, segregation of the stimulus object in the other. The holistic approach seeks order at the interobject interface, that is, in the relations between selected and nonselected locations/objects in the visual field. The study of the organization of the visual field is a natural focus of this approach. A prominent domain of the holistic approach became epitomized by the search for the means by which the selection processes are best characterized. The analytical approach, in contrast, is epitomized by the search for intraobject structure and relations. Of foremost interest is the ability to direct attention to a privileged dimension of the stimulus.
The respective units of attentional selection derive from these disparate perspectives. Because regions and objects inhere in space, they formed the units of selection within the holistic framework with processing consequences for the rest of the space and its objects. Given that the spotlight illuminates the entire target (note, incidentally, that object-based models are not uniformly inhospitable to the spotlight analogy), intratarget processing has been fairly neglected in these models (but see Kahneman & Henik, 1981 , Treisman et al., 1983 , for notable exceptions). Because a dimension inheres in the stimulus, it forms the unit of selection in the analytic framework with processing consequences for the other dimensions as well as for the stimulus as a whole. This latter model takes the perceptual object as its point of departure. Consequently, issues relating to the organization of the visual space as a whole and to selection are neglected.
We believe that each approach has something valuable to offer, and, as a matter of fact, they complement each other. The two frameworks tap different systems of attentional processing, both normally used in visual processing. The result of primary importance emerging from this study is the demonstration that two popular paradigms using the term "attention" do, in fact, tap different processes. Garner's "attention" is not the same as Posner's "attention." The most parsimonious account of the current results would seem to be provided by a hierarchical model in which a Posnerian holistic processing precedes a Garnerian analytic processing. The results do not allow for any specific instantination of such a model, but we believe they do lend support for a preliminary account in terms of a simple additive model. We conclude with a comparison of the present findings with the results of current electrophysiological research on these same issues. Again, the parallels are remarkable.
Physiological Complementarity
In the last 10 years, we have witnessed a tremendous increase in our understanding of the physiological underpinnings of selective attention. Three anatomically separate networks have been identified, each of which is thought to carry out a unique attentional function (Posner & Raichle, 1994) . Strikingly, two of these networks coincide precisely with the attentional systems identified and dissociated behaviorally in this study. (The third network is a generic system concerned with maintaining vigilance-fully compatible with the present results.) The first network reviewed by Posner and Raichle (1994) is that sustaining visual orientation. Parietal, thalamic, and midbrain structures are involved in the covert orienting of attention. The parietal lobe acts to disengage attention from its current focus (at an initially central location in our experiments), the midbrain moves the spotlight to the cued area, and the thalamus selects the illuminated area and enhances its entire content by affording it priority in processing. At the same time, Posner and Raichle recognized the need for the "information remaining in the spotlight... [to] be passed on for further processing" (p. 166). This further processing entails the identification of components of the stimulus (in the spotlight!), selectively attending to privileged features dictated by nature or by the experimenter, and semantic analysis of the stimulus. This intrastimulus analysis is performed by a different attentional network, the executive attention network, located anatomically in the anterior regions of the brain-in particular, the anterior cingulate. Remarkably for the present concerns, the Stroop effect has served as the major behavioral vehicle to identify the anterior cingulate system. Thus, "the anterior cingulate system is more active during trials of the Stroop task in which conflict exists than during trials in which it does not" (Posner & Raichle, 1994, p. 171) .
Therefore, the two attentional systems that were shown to operate in an unrelated manner in the current study were also found to be distinct anatomically, emanating from widely separated cortical and subcortical sites. We also note that, quite independently of our behavioral study, Posner and his associates have separately used the current tasks of visual orienting and Stroop to identify separate networks of attention governed by separate anatomical structures. The truly unique feature of our behavioral study was the concurrent application of the two tasks, thereby providing compelling data on the mutual independence of important systems of attention. Exploring the properties of these specific attentional networks as well as determining the form of concatenation of their effects in producing the unity of people's subjective experience remain daunting tasks.
